BRF-07·
Parallel Playbooks
How multiple state actors converge on strikingly similar critical-infrastructure tradecraft, and what the overlap reveals about intent.
Parallel Playbooks examines a striking convergence: state actors that differ sharply in geography, ideology, and strategic aim nonetheless arrive at remarkably similar tradecraft against critical infrastructure. The paper treats this overlap not as coincidence but as a signal, asking what it reveals about shared intent, shared learning, and the shared structure of the targets themselves.
The analysis compares operational patterns — initial access through internet-facing devices, living-off-the-land persistence, and patient pre-positioning inside sensitive networks — across multiple adversaries. It argues that the similarities arise from a combination of capability diffusion between aligned states and the simple fact that critical infrastructure worldwide runs on the same narrow set of technologies.
The paper draws out the strategic implication: when adversaries share a playbook, defenders can too. Techniques observed against one sector or one nation become predictive of activity elsewhere, and intelligence about one actor’s methods can inoculate defenders against others. Convergence, in other words, is both a threat and an opportunity.
It closes by recommending that defenders build detection and resilience around the common tradecraft rather than around individual named actors, and that allied nations pool observations to turn adversary convergence into a defensive advantage. It is published by the East West Strategic Research Collective on ResearchGate.